Photo: iStock
Zoltán Hegyes
25/11/2025 08:00
Although Western green politics had already been urging a shift away from fossil fuels for a decade before 2022, the war provided fresh political and rhetorical momentum for this agenda.
As a result of sanctions, Europe’s energy prices surged and have remained at historically high levels, placing severe strain on households and businesses alike. For Hungary—whose infrastructure, due to both geography and history, was built around the use of Russian energy—disconnecting from these supplies would have grave consequences.
Hungary is a landlocked country, dependent on net energy imports and home to significant industrial capacity. Since the Druzhba (“Friendship”) oil pipeline began operations in 1964, Russian energy has become a cornerstone of both the Hungarian and the broader regional energy sectors. This connection is geographically logical for Central Europe and has persisted even after the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, together with the industries and infrastructure that rely on it. At present, there is no viable alternative.
In 2023, Hungary and Slovakia together imported 12.45 million tonnes of crude oil, while the Adria pipeline can deliver only 11.8 million tonnes. Capacity tests conducted by MOL and Croatia’s oil company JANAF in recent weeks confirmed that the Adria line alone cannot transport enough oil to meet the region’s needs. Moreover, the refineries in Százhalombatta and Bratislava were designed over decades specifically to process Russian crude blends.
A ban on Russian oil would therefore cut refinery output, creating a severe supply crisis amid steady demand. According to a price elasticity study by the Századvég Foundation, such a scenario could double fuel prices, with direct and serious consequences for inflation and the wider economy.
Beyond the physical constraints, market realities also clash with Western political ambitions. Russian energy has long played a vital role in Germany—and thus in the entire continent’s economy. The relationship was natural: Russia provided Europe’s advanced industries with a convenient, inexpensive source of energy, while gaining a stable market in return. It was a textbook case of mutually beneficial cooperation, and the consequences of restricting that market are equally evident.
In 2021, Russia held a 22 per cent share of the EU’s LNG imports and 48 per cent in pipeline gas; these have since dropped to 19 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. The artificially restricted supply has raised prices on the Dutch gas exchange from €15–20 per megawatt hour to around €35–40, while also increasing volatility—an indicator of overall market uncertainty. Europe’s industry is clearly suffering the consequences, and replacing the German–Russian economic partnership has proven difficult even in the short term.
Meanwhile, the continent’s dependence on external actors has not diminished—only shifted from East to West, now accompanied by greater uncertainty. For Hungary, given both the physical limits of substitution and Russia’s geographical position, energy import strategy must remain pragmatic. Maintaining the current cooperation is essential for ensuring connectivity and preserving the foundation of mutually beneficial relations in the future.
The author is a trainee adviser at the Energy and Climate Policy Division of Századvég Konjunktúrakutató Zrt