Hungary has held the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union for the past six months. What do you consider the greatest achievement of the Presidency?
Hungary took over the baton under difficult circumstances, as the new European Commission only took office in December and the European Parliament was still searching for itself in the months after the elections. It's not easy to reach agreement on the big issues, but we managed to come to an agreement with the institutions and, for example, we have a budget for next year. It was not automatic. The most important result is that after the European Political Community summit in Budapest, at the informal meeting of the European Council, we succeeded in adopting a competitiveness pact on the basis of which we can start substantive work and dialogue on competitiveness.
What is the Hungarian proposal to restore Europe's competitiveness?
We do not believe that further centralisation, the creation of a so-called 'United States of Europe', will solve the problem. We have been saying for a long time that maintaining connectivity and openness is not only in the interest of member states. For Europe, openness has always been a competitive advantage, which has underpinned Europe's prosperity and weight in the world. Competitiveness must also be taken into account within Europe, because Europe, although a small continent in size, is large enough and fragmented enough that its different regions have capabilities and talents that cannot be standardised. Each region must be allowed to make the best of its own talents. We need to return to what we have long said: that Europe's strength has been its policy based on consensus.
Do procedures such as the imposition of punitive tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles on member states not fit in with this understanding?
It is this perception - a decision-making mechanism, if you like - that must be got rid of, because it leads to a dead end. If a lot of such decisions are taken that those involved - or some of them - do not actually want to implement in the end, it is clearly not in the interests of European competitiveness. This is particularly true in this current example, because who are the main objectors? The German car manufacturers, but also the French. It should be a benchmark, however, if the very industry it is supposed to protect protests against a measure. I assume that it is not only the Hungarian prime minister who regularly consults the German car manufacturers, but that the EU institutions also listen to their views.
What consequences does the Hungarian government foresee for punitive tariffs? There have been press reports that Chinese companies from countries in favour of the measure are transferring investments to those against. Could this be good for Hungary?
We conclude that it cannot be good. In principle, the basic idea of a policy of isolation will not lead anywhere. The question will soon arise with regard to the United States, as the next president will pursue a policy of firmly protecting the US market. We cannot come out of such a battle well - not only Hungary, but the whole of Europe. Decisions should be based not on ideology but on common sense. The best example of this is the so-called green transition decision. Nobody disputes the original intention, but decisions that destroy European farmers and kill the engine of the European economy also lead to a dead end.
Are we likely to see a sharpening of the rift between the European Commission and the member states because of bad decisions? In the case of China, for example, despite punitive tariffs, nation-state leaders are visiting Beijing one after another in the hope of big deals.
This is not only to be expected, it is happening. In more and more areas, the European Commission has been taking powers, more and more elements of sovereignty, away from the member states for a decade now. The treaties clearly set out which elements of sovereignty member states are handing over - not giving up, but handing over to the EU institutions for joint exercise. This does not mean that they have given up their sovereignty, but that they exercise these elements of sovereignty jointly. The EU institutions are afraid of tampering with the treaties, so they exercise a covert withdrawal of powers. Think of the purchase of vaccines, the joint purchase of gas, or the migration pact.
After the European Political Community summit in Budapest, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that while the others were surprised by Donald Trump's victory, he was sure of it all along. You mentioned the expected tariffs - beyond bilateral relations, could the Republican candidate's victory have a positive impact on EU relations?
With President Trump, apart from the good personal relationship, there is one very important principle, and that is that we approach each other on the basis of mutual respect, which is something that is completely lacking in much of Western European politics. If we are looking for a link between American and European policy, that alone would justify a relationship between the two countries that is accepting and respectful of each other's political points of view, in addition to good personal relations. It is another question that, of course, the expected decisions in Washington will affect Europe universally, and I would be cautious about whether it is possible to achieve a privileged status. We have drawn attention to these steps in advance. Europe needs to be sensible when negotiating trade with the United States, because it is not in our interest to isolate ourselves.
Would Donald Trump also respect Hungarian views on China?
I think that ideological pressure should not be expected, and that in itself will be a great relief. Our starting point is that Hungary is still a place where investment can come from anywhere. We are open and want to offer the best conditions. Anyone who comes to Hungary to invest, to produce, to create innovation bases, is not only benefiting Hungary, but is also acting for the competitiveness and economy of Europe. By the way, this does not contradict the economic policy of President Trump, for example, because he did not say that production for the United States should not be produced in China, but that production that Americans consume and that American technology makes possible should be produced in the United States.
The author is deputy editor-in-chief of Eurasia