Photo: AFP/Vyacheslav Oseledko
Szabolcs Veres
09/04/2025 22:32
The European Union, often underestimated in terms of its geopolitical influence, has shifted by early 2025 to a post-Soviet region that could strategically play a pivotal role in trade relations between China and Europe (or East-West). This shift is partly due to the EU's earlier determination to diversify its energy needs and partly due to the tariffs announced by Donald Trump.
On April 3-4, 2025, the leaders of the European Union and the five Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—convened in Samarkand for the inaugural Central Asia-European Union Summit. This landmark meeting occurred during a period of significant global economic and political turbulence, characterized by the erosion of established international norms, resurgence in military competition, and mounting challenges related to geopolitical tensions and climate change.
The summit was further elevated by the presence of the EU's foremost leadership, including António Costa, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. This personal representation of the EU's top leadership in Samarkand underscored the significance of the event. The summit represented more than just a diplomatic forum; it presented a strategic opportunity to deepen cooperation between the two regions, which share similar interests, challenges, and aspirations in certain areas.
Central Asia, a region traditionally overshadowed by regional powers such as Russia, China, and Turkey due to its strategic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, has recently witnessed a shift in the EU's geopolitical standing. Despite the attempts by Russia and the United States to diminish its role in the Ukraine war settlement and portray it as a "geopolitical midget," the EU is increasingly seeking to augment its presence in global affairs, as evidenced by the Samarkand meeting.
In Central Asia, the 27-nation bloc is often regarded as a pivotal player on which the five 'stans' - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan - can depend to maintain a balance of power between China and Russia.
Concurrently, Brussels's endeavors to fortify existing collaborative ties with Central Asia can be interpreted as a strategy to curtail Russia's sway within the region. Moscow's ongoing engagement in the Ukraine crisis has gradually diminished its influence in Central Asia, a region that has historically been within the Kremlin's geopolitical sphere of influence. Consequently, China has successfully augmented its economic presence in all five Central Asian nations. In response, the EU is now pursuing a similar strategy.
But an additional problem for Brussels is that China's proximity to Central Asia has already given Beijing 12 years to strengthen economic ties with the region through the BRI. As a result, China's total trade with Central Asia will reach USD 94.8 billion in 2024, almost double the USD 47 billion trade between the EU and the region in 2022. Moreover, in 2024, the world's second largest economy replaced Russia as Kazakhstan's largest trading partner. In neighbouring Uzbekistan, China remains the most important trading partner, while in Tajikistan, China has become the number one investor in the landlocked country's economy over the past 18 years. The same applies to Tajikistan and China's neighbour Kyrgyzstan.
But why now?
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has demonstrated a heightened level of interest in Central Asia and has extended a range of cooperative opportunities to countries in the region. The EU has articulated a long-term commitment to the promotion of energy and transport projects within the region.
Despite the EU's pursuit of common interests with the United States in this region, it has charted a distinct course of action in its engagement with Central Asia. In 2019, the EU adopted the EU Strategy for Central Asia, which was subsequently complemented by multilateral mechanisms and initiatives in subsequent years. In 2021, European countries proposed the Global Gateway Initiative, which aims to diversify economic links with countries in the region and create new logistics chains. In January 2024, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the EU Strategy for Central Asia, which also reflected European policy objectives towards the region.
Samarkand's objectives
For the European Union's capital, Brussels, critical mineral resources represent a pivotal component in its strategic approach to Central Asia, alongside natural gas and oil. The 27-nation bloc has formally entered into memoranda of understanding concerning raw materials with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and seeks to establish more intimate energy relations with Turkmenistan, a country with abundant natural gas reserves. The EU's objectives include "assisting" Ashgabat in its integration into regional and global trade networks and in the modernization of its infrastructure.
However, when viewed through a different lens, it becomes evident that the EU's objectives in Central Asia bear a striking resemblance to those of US President Donald Trump, who has expressed a strong desire to gain access to Ukraine's natural resources. However, in contrast to the United States, the European Union lacks the capacity to issue ultimatums to Central Asian nations. Recognizing this limitation, the EU is pursuing strategies to augment its soft power in the region.
Moreover, given the fundamental "transformation" of USAID, the EU now has the opportunity to fill the void left by the Americans as a possible new Western actor. The efforts of Euronews to cultivate media collaboration with Turkmenistan can be regarded as an initial step in this direction.
Nevertheless, the EU is regarded by Central Asian nations as a counterbalance to the growing economic dominance of China in the region. For these nations, collaboration with the EU, comprising 27 nations, presents an opportunity to diversify their foreign trade and attract additional investment to develop infrastructure and other pivotal sectors of their economies.
While Beijing is cognizant of the fact that the EU will not pose a primary competitive threat to China in Central Asia in the long term, it does not appear to be averse to Brussels' plans to develop the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor). Indeed, the European development plans for the route, which originates in China and traverses Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia en route to Europe, bear a striking resemblance to China's position, which underscores the enhancement of relations between China and Europe.
Notably, the Middle Corridor has become a point of divergence. Ukrainian officials have asserted that a portion of Chinese goods will be routed through Ukraine, utilizing the Caspian Sea transport corridor for European delivery. Consequently, the Kremlin may encounter challenges in sustaining its historical influence in Central Asia, as the EU and China may engage in a geopolitical contest for preeminence.
The author is a researcher at the Eurasia Center